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Abstract 
In both economically developed and developing countries, privatisation, budget austerity 
measures and market liberalisations have become key aspects of structural reform programs 
in the last three decades. These three recommended policies were parts of strong revival of 
classical and new-classical school of thought since the middle of 70s. Such programs aim to 
achieve higher microeconomic efficiency and foster economic growth, whilst also aspiring to 
reduce public sector borrowing requirements through the elimination of unnecessary 
subsidies. For firms to achieve superior performance a change in ownership from public 
(state ownership) to private has been recommended as a vital condition. To assess the 
ownership role, the economic performances of private, public and mixed enterprises in 
Bulgaria is compared through the use of factor analysis method. The extracted factors, using 
data of two years, 1998 and 2000, do not pick ownership as a key performance factor.   
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1. Introduction  
Both developed and developing countries have progressively engaged in ambitious 
privatisation programs for several decades. Over the years, the number of privatisation 
transactions has grown. From 2000 to 2007, the sale of state-owned assets reached $497.7 
billion in OECD countries. To illustrate the relevance of this policy, table 1 shows how the 
change in European state-owned enterprises shares in GDP for the year 2006, and is grouped 
with income level in accordance with the OECD’s classification.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The change does not only respond to privatisation strategies, but is also strongly linked to 
them. It reflects the declining role of the public sector as owner of productive assets in the 
economy. 
 
Microeconomic theory suggests that incentive and contracting problems create inefficiencies 
as a result of public ownership; provided that managers of state-owned enterprises pursue 
objectives that differ from those of private firms (political view) and are less monitored 
(management view). Objectives are distorted, as well as faced with softened budget 
constraints because bankruptcy is not a plausible threat to public managers and gives rise to 
soft-budget constraint. As a preventative measure of financial distress, it is thus in the central 
government’s own interest to bail public managers out in times of financial distress. 
Theoretical implications are confirmed by numbers of empirical evidences (there are, 
however, some empirical evidences, which show opposite results), in the sense that changing 
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ownership through privatisation raises profitability and efficiency in both competitive and 
monopolistic sectors. 
 
In 1993, Bulgaria announced a voucher privatisation programme. The legal framework for this 
economic adjustment was completed in 1995 with the adoption of the Privatisation Funds Act.  81 
privatisation funds started to implement the programme. The privatisation programme provided for 
three successive centralised auctions during the first round.  
 
All Bulgarian citizens over the age of 18 were eligible to participate in voucher privatisation. The first 
round of voucher privatisation began in 1996 based on a list of 1, 040 companies from all sectors of 
the economy and finished in 1997. A maximum 25% stake could be offered for sale in large 
enterprises and up to 90% of medium and small companies. Employees, managers and former 
employees of companies to be privatised could acquire up to 10% of the stake offered for sale free of 
charge. Voucher holders could either exchange vouchers for shares in privatisation funds or bid 
directly for enterprise shares at the centralised auctions. Vouchers could be transferred to relatives, 
but could not be traded. More than 50% (3 million persons) of the eligible population took part in the 
first round of voucher privatisation. Then the Government of Bulgaria made a critical analysis of the 
first round of voucher privatisation. A new model of privatisation through investment vouchers was 
introduced, which was known as the Privatisation Act in 1998. The main objective was to accelerate 
privatisation. 
 
The set objectives for privatisation programs in different countries to achieve are far broader, 
and fundamentally involve the improvement of microeconomic efficiency. Generally, there 
are four explicit objectives in such programs.  
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i) to attain higher efficiency in terms of allocation and productivity; 
ii) to create a stronger role for the private sector within the economy; 
iii) to advance the financial health of the public sector; and 
iv) to liberate resources for allocation in other essential areas of activity within the 
government (normally associated with social policy).  
 
Privatisation programs should, consequently, be considered by looking at the level at which 
the stated aims have been reached, on one hand, and what role the ownership has played to 
reach all the above goals, on the other hand. Theoretical arguments behind the view that 
privatisation can attain these aims as well as surveys of the empirical literature are reviewed.  
 
The purpose of this article is to investigate whether ownership has been a significant 
characteristic of enterprise performance in Bulgaria. This attempt is part of a broader 
investigation series, which is being conducted to discover the characteristics of ownership 
with regards to enterprise performance. In this article, the performance of three differently 
owned companies, state, private and mixed, will be considered and factor analysis 
methodology will be deployed. This will permit the use of quantitative and qualitative data 
alongside each other to extract common factors of these types of activities.   
 
The paper has four further sections. The second section is dedicated to reviewing literature; 
including theoretical arguments, which support the view that private ownership is favoured 
over public ownership. Specific testable inferences are proposed as guidelines to the 
empirical survey. The third section presents a viable methodological option to assess the 
characteristic of ownership in the context of enterprise performances in Bulgaria.  The fourth 
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section is devoted to analysing results. And the final section is consists of concluding 
remarks.  
 
2 The Literature 
2.1 Theory 
2.1.1 The Managerial Perspective. 
 
Low-powered incentives, according to the ‘managerial’ perspective, are behind imperfect 
monitoring in public-owned enterprises. The managers of state-owned enterprises are poorly 
monitored because the firms are not traded in the market as they are with private firms. This 
means that the threat of take-over when the firm performs poorly is abolished. According to 
Yarrow, (1986) and Vickers and Yarrow, (1989), shareholders are unable to observe and 
affect the performance of the enterprises.  
 
Another argument, which is put forward by this perspective, is that of SOE (state owned 
enterprises) debt actually perceived as being public debt and traded under different 
conditions. Debt markets cannot play the role of disciplining the managers of public-owned 
enterprises. It has been argued that this problem can be solved by privatisation, without 
having to pursue complete divestiture.  
 
Furthermore, managers of SOEs can increase the scale of production, since bankruptcy is a 
non-credible threat under public ownership. In contrast, for a private manager, this would be 
a real threat of failure, which could reduce productive efficiency.  
 
  
 
Page 6 
 
2.1.2 The Political Perspective 
 
It is argued by the ‘political’ perspective that distortions in the aim, the function (Shapiro and 
Willig (1990)) and the constraints private managers face, through the so-called soft budget 
constraint problem (Kornai (1980, 1986)), result in lower efficiency under public ownership. 
Public managers, who have a tendency to report to politicians and pursue political careers 
themselves, incorporate objective function aspects relating to the maximisation of 
employment in their actions. Their desire to maximise their employment is at the expense of 
efficiency and political prestige (the empire building hypothesis).  
 
Managers do not face the risk of bankruptcy because of soft budget constraint.  Wherever 
firms have engaged in unwise investments, it is in the central government’s interest to bail 
them out using the public budget. The rationale behind this is that the bankruptcy of a firm 
would be very costly from a political stand-point, and such burden would be distributed 
within well-defined political groups, such as unions.  
  
The cost of a bail out can instead be shared by the taxpayers, a less organised and larger 
group in society with assorted interests and preferences. This is because under public 
ownership, the threat of bankruptcy is non-credible. Thus, we can, by way of a rather simple 
assumption, obtain the soft budget constraint result as the equilibrium in the race between the 
public manager and the central government (or “ministry of finance”). This supposition is 
such that the political loss associated with closing a publicly-owned company is greater than 
political costs of using taxpayer money to bail it out (or public debt, i.e. future tax collection). 
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2.2 Evidence 
 
Empirical studies to evaluate the privatisation performance can be categorised into two 
groups: Microeconomic and macroeconomic evidence. More tangible conclusions can be 
drawn from the microeconomic perspective rather than from the macroeconomic one. The 
following case studies span prior to and following privatisation. They exhibit country-
specific, cross-sector evidence that looks into performance changes of firms in different 
sectors within the same country, as well as cross-country evidence that uses data from 
publicly traded firms in different countries to evaluate changes in their financial status.  
 
2.2.1 Microeconomic Evidence 
 
Some empirical evidences strongly support the view that privatisation has positive effects on 
profitability and efficiency at the microeconomic level. However, alongside these results, 
there are, at the same time, some studies, which point to opposite results.   
 
The first piece of evidence consists of case studies, among which Galal, et. al. (1994) shows 
comprehensive evidence. This study looks at the performance of twelve privatised firms in 
four different countries. The methodology of their case study is counterfactual and makes 
projections of the firms’ performance fall under the privatisation scenario and a hypothetical 
“public ownership scenario”. Changes in welfare are measured by way of a comparison 
between these two scenarios. In four cases, consumer welfare has increased; in five of them it 
has decreased, and it has remained unaltered in the rest. In nine cases, the government has a 
net gain, and the firm’s buyers gained in all of them. Through the partial equilibrium nature 
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of this analysis, a distinctly positive effect of privatisation on total welfare is shown by these 
firm studies. 
 
The second type of study focuses on one specific country and analyses evidence across 
industries. LaPorta and López-De-Silanes (1998) analyse the performance of 218 enterprises 
in Mexico in 26 different sectors between 1983 and 1991. An essential aspect of this work is 
the authors’ decomposition of the changes in profitability into price increases, labour 
reduction and productivity gains. Two common criticisms of privatisation are addressed by 
their analysis. The first is that at the expense of society, through charging higher prices, the 
profitability of firms has increased. The second is that firms have made profits at the expense 
of workers, whose labour contracts are less generous and involve significant layoffs.  Results 
indicate that profitability, measured through the ratio of operating income to sales, rose by 24 
percentage points. However, such gains are decomposed into the following components: i) an 
increase in price constitutes 10% of the results; ii) laid-off workers constitute 33%; iii) 
productivity gains constitute 57%. A regression analysis is also carried out to identify the role 
of market power and deregulation in determining privatisation outcomes. 
 
Smith et al (1996) study privatisation in Slovenia. They use a country-wide database with 
privatised firms from 1989 to 1992. Their objective is to analyse the effect of various types of 
ownership on performance. The results indicate a visibly positive effect of privatisation on 
ownership performances. Foreign ownership, for example, has shown an outstandingly 
positive effect on the performance when it comes to distinguishing the effects of different 
types of ownership. However, it appears that employee-owned firms have performed 
relatively better than those owned through foreign investment.  
  
 
Page 9 
 
Gupta et.al (2008) examine the consequences of privatisation program in the Czech Republic. 
They used data of the year 1992 at the firm-level for firms with 25 or more workers. The 
results they found show that privatised firms are among more profitable firms. However, for 
the government of the Czech Republic the main objective was to maximizing government 
revenues through selling public assets.   
 
Mestiri (2010) investigates the impact of privatization on the Tunisian government owned 
airline, Tunisair, over the period of 1976-2007.  20 % of the capital of the Tunisair was 
privatized by the government using the initial public offering method in July 1995. The 
author used data envelopment analysis to evaluate the efficiency of Tunisair privatization. 
After privatization Tunisair has experienced a better economic efficiency, as its technical 
efficiency scores have increased from 0.743 to scores close to 1.  
 
Cross country evidence starts with a very important study by Megginson et al (1994).  They 
analyse pre and post privatisation performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 
industries, which were privatised between 1961 and 1990 through public offerings. D’Souza 
and Megginson (1998) carry out the same type of study by using 78 companies from 25 
countries, including 10 LCDs that faced privatisation during 1990 to 1994 through public 
offering. Their sample includes 14 banks, 21 utility and 10 telecommunication companies. 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) use data of 79 companies from 21 developing countries. These 
firms were privatised between 1980 and 1992 through public offerings.  
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Claessens and Djankov (1998) use the largest data set, consisting of 6.300 manufacturing 
firms in seven Central and Eastern European countries, namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The performance indicators are 
analysed by presenting mean and median levels of profitability, sales, operating efficiency, 
leverage, capital expenditures and employment. There are, in most cases, controls for whether 
the markets are competitive; regulated or unregulated, as well as controls for partial versus 
full privatisation. The evidence is robustly in favour of the better performance of firms after 
privatisation. Profitability has largely increased with varying specifications, periods of time 
and groups of countries.  
 
Interestingly enough, in both Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and D’Souza and Megginson 
(1998), profitability increased more than operating efficiency in regulated (or non-
competitive) industries. Thus, higher profitability does not necessary imply higher efficiency, 
and the market structure links both concepts. The idea that a certain degree of market power 
is being exploited by firms is also supported by the evidence. In all cases, capital expenditure 
(investment) systematically increased, reflecting both growth and the post-sale restructuring 
which took place. Employment increased in all cases, including those of developing 
countries.  
 
It seems that this evidence on employment is inconsistent with that in, for example, LaPorta 
and López-De-Silanes (1998) work. There are two justifications for such inconsistency. 
Firstly, a non-negligible selection bias is generated. The cross-country studies analysed by the 
authors use only data from firms that were sold via public offerings. Such firms are the ones 
expected to have higher potential for profitability. Secondly, the author’s country-specific 
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study incorporates data from three years prior to the privatisation of all firms. This potentially 
eliminates labour redundancy prior to sales. Fully privatised firms perform better than 
partially privatised ones in all of the cases.  
 
Frydman et al (1997) reported improvement in corporate performance that was consistent 
with the results shown above, in the case of transition economies. Robustly positive 
performance alterations in a large sample of firms in Central and Eastern Europe were 
reported by Frydman et al (1998) and Claessens and Djankov (1998). They were interested in 
testing the political view, i.e. whether the withdrawal of political intervention provides an 
explanation for the positive results. The former paper found outstanding improvements in 
total factor productivity and a decline in excess employment in firms without state 
intervention. It controlled for institutional differences and the endogenity of privatisation 
choices. The latter paper found evidence that entrepreneurial behaviour drives the efficiency 
gains on removal of state intervention. The authors conclude that the performance results of 
privatised companies are the features of a greater willingness to comprehend risks and a 
liberty to make decisions without state intervention. 
 
Brawn, et. al. (2005) analyse the effects of privatization on state owned manufacturing firms 
in Hungary, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine. They use time series data of annual observations 
to compare both before and after privatization performance. They used longitudinal 
econometric methods to obtain comparable estimates across countries. The result shows a 
substantially positive effect of privatization on productivity in Romania and Hungry. 
Moreover, the estimated effects for Romania are significantly bigger than for Hungary.  The 
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estimated effects in Ukraine are positive, but lower than Romania and Hungary. Contrary to 
these countries, the estimated effects are negative for the last county, Russia. 
 
2.2.2 Macroeconomic Evidence 
 
There is no certain evidence of the effects of privatisation at the macroeconomic level. 
However, it is possible to provide an overview of the patterns observed in key aggregate 
variables and structural reform measures were also put in place to some extent in most 
countries. These policy measures include, amongst others, trade liberalisation, fiscal 
adjustment, tax reform and weakening of controls to capital inflows. Whilst it is impossible to 
attribute observed trends to one isolated policy, we can argue, on the basis of theoretical 
arguments, that macroeconomic trends are connected.  
 
Evidence supporting the claim that privatisation reduces the burden on public financing is 
shown in the aforementioned studies. Following reform, both low and middle income 
countries have, on average, succeeded in eliminating net subsidies to public enterprises. 
SOEs display a surplus in their operation as far as middle income countries are concerned. 
This can result from reforms in management and the introduction of competition, as well as 
the concept of “best” firms being those which have remained in the hands of the government. 
For example, oil companies and natural monopolies like electric utilities. 
 
Reforms are being considered in countries where the trend in fiscal deficit is still largely 
negative. There, the most favourable trend is that of the deficit in upper middle income 
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economies – where the most aggressive reformers can be found, such as Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico and Malaysia.  
 
A central effect observed in all income groups is that of financial sector development (see 
Demirguc and Levine (1994) and McLindon (1996)). For both low and middle income 
economies, reforms have had an impact on that indicator of capital market development; 
whereas, in high income countries, capitalisation of the stock market has remained stable. All 
such economies show a positive trend. Upper middle income countries have reached levels of 
capitalisation similar to those in high income economies (approximately 55% of GDP). The 
low-income group is approximately 16% and lower middle income economies are roughly 
25%. 
 
This mobilisation of resources and consistency of reforms has subsequently attracted more 
direct investment by foreigners. Middle income countries show a positive trend in foreign 
direct investment; whereas, low-income countries, in which reforms and privatisation have 
been more aggressive, show a significant increase of such investment in later years. Lastly, in 
terms of GDP growth, the pattern is rather stable across income groups with no clear trend. 
However, in low and lower middle income economies, variability is larger.  
 
Conversely, unemployment shows a rather irregular pattern across countries. Aggressive, late 
and less aggressive reformers illustrate an increase in the unemployment rate. Argentina and 
Poland are examples of aggressive reformers, where the unemployment rate rose by 9 and 8 
percentage points, respectively, between 1990 and 1996. France and Hungary are amongst 
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the late and less aggressive reformers, where unemployment grew 3.5 and 3%, respectively, 
throughout the same period. In terms of privatisation, it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions on the overall unemployment rate. In recent years, unemployment has shown a 
rising trend in most countries around the world (see Demirguc and Levine (1994) and 
McLindon (1996)).  
 
As theoretical stand points support the policy adjustment of selling the government owned 
enterprises to private buyers and argue that the implementation of policy would lead to higher 
economic efficiencies of privatised firms, better allocations of resources and consumers 
benefits, the empirical studies show mixed results. Some studies indicate very higher 
economic and financial achievements from the policy reform namely privatisation and some 
show negative results.   
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
To assess enterprise performance and the role of ownership in Bulgaria there are several 
methodologies. These include: total factor productivity, factor analysis, cost benefit analysis 
and ratio analysis. Among these methods, factor analysis may be more useful than the others 
as our aim is to incorporate quantitative and qualitative variables alongside each other. This 
technique can be used to measure comparative enterprise performance and the subsequent 
role of ownership in output results from the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). 
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Factor analysis is a mathematical tool which can be used to examine a wide range of data 
sets. It has been used in disciplines as diverse as economics, chemistry, sociology and 
psychology because of its ability to analyse the performance of a variety of different aspects. 
The main functions of factor analytic techniques can be summarised as follows: (1) to reduce 
the number of variables and (2) to detect structure in the relationships between variables, that 
is to classify variables. Therefore, factor analysis is applied as a data reduction or structure 
detection method. 
 
The term factor analysis was first introduced by Thurstone in 1931. Many statistical methods 
can be used to study the relation between independent and dependent variables. However, the 
factor analysis approach is unique in that it studies patterns to discover the relationship 
among many dependent variables. Its goal is to discover something about the nature of the 
independent variables that affect dependent variables; without measuring those independent 
variables. Consequently, when independent variables are observed directly, answers obtained 
by factor analysis are hypothetical and tentative. The conditional independent variables are 
called factors. 
 
A typical factor analysis advocates answers to four major questions:  
 
1. How many different factors are needed to explain the pattern of relationships among 
these variables?  
2. What is the nature of those factors?  
3. How well do the hypothesized factors explain the observed data?  
4. How much purely random or unique variance does each observed variable include? 
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Factor analysis needs a set of data points in matrix form. The terms 'row designee' and 
'column designee' are referred to the row and column identifiers of the matrix. This 
terminology is used because of the very wide range of data matrix types that may be analyzed 
by factor analysis. To carry out this method the data must be bi-linear. Therefore, the row 
entities and the column entities must be independent of each other. Factor analysis comprises 
of both component analysis and common factor analysis. The purpose is to discover simple 
patterns in the pattern of relationships among the variables. Above all, it seeks to discover if 
the observed variables can be explained largely or entirely in terms of a much smaller number 
of variables called factors. 
  
3.1. Factor Analysis Method 
 
This method can be used to identify whether a number of variables of interest Y1, Y2, ..., Yl, 
are linearly related to a smaller number of unobservable factors F1, F2, ..., Fk.  Factors are 
observed in factor analysis; whereas, in other methods such as regression analysis they are 
not. The hypothesized factor model under certain conditions has certain implications. These 
implications in turn can be tested against the observations. To explain this method three 
variables, Y1, Y2, and Y3, and three factors have been extracted. It is assumed that each Y 
variable is linearly related to the two factors, as follows: 
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The error terms e1, e2, and e3, demonstrate that the hypothesized relationships are not exact. 
The parameters  are referred to as loadings. For example,   is called the loading of 
variable Y1 on factor F2. It is expected that the loadings have roughly the following structure 
if, for example, Y1 is assumed to be a quantitative variable and Y2 and Y3 are two qualitative 
variables: 
Loading on:                   
Variable, Yi                     F1, F2,  
   Y1                                                +         0 
   Y2                                                0         + 
   Y3                                                0          + 
The zeros in the preceding table are not expected to be exactly equal to zero.  
By `0' we mean approximately equal to zero and by `+' a positive number substantially different from zero.  
 
From the above equations it may be observed that the loadings can be estimated and the 
expectations tested by regressing each Y against the two factors. However, this is not feasible 
as the factors cannot be observed. An entirely new strategy is required.  
The simplest model of factor analysis is based on two assumptions.  
 
A1: The error terms ei are independent of one another, and such that  
E(ei) = 0 and Var (ei) = . 
A2: The unobservable factors Fi are independent of one another and of the error 
terms, and are such that  
E(Fj) = 0 and Var(Fj) =1. 
 
In more advanced models, the condition that the factors are independent can be relaxed. As 
for the factor means and variances, the assumption is that the factors are standardized. It is an 
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assumption made for mathematical convenience; since the factors are not observable, we 
might as well think of them as measured in standardized form. To examine the implications 
of these assumptions let each observable variable be a linear function of independent factors 
and error terms, and be written as 
 
 
 
The variance of Yi can be calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
The variance of Yi consists of two parts: 
 
 
                                                                         
 
The first, the communality of the variable, is the part that is explained by the common factors 
F1 and F2. The second, the specific variance, is the part of the variance of Yi that is not 
accounted for by the common factors. If the two factors were perfect predictors of grades, 
then  
 
e1 = e2 = e3 = 0 always, and  
 
To calculate the covariance of any two observable variables, Yi and Yj, we can write 
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Var ( ) + ) + (0) (1) 
Var (  
               +  
 
All the variances and co-variances can be shown on the following table: 
 
                                                                         Variable 
Variable                   Y1                                   Y2                                     Y3  
     Y1             
     Y2   
      Y3   
 
The variances of the Y variables are in the diagonal cells of the table and the co-variances of 
the Y variables are in the horizontal cells of the table. This table is called the theoretical 
variance co-variance matrix. The matrix is symmetric, in the sense that the entry in row 1 and 
column 2 is the same as that in row 2 and column 1, and so on. If observations on the  
Variable 
Variable Y1 Y2 Y3 
Y1    
Y2    
Y3    
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Variables Y1, Y2, and Y3 are given, the observed variances and co-variances of those 
variables can be calculated and arranged in an observed variance co-variance matrix as 
follows: 
 
Thus,  is the observed variance of Y1, S12 the observed co-variance of Y1 and Y2, and so 
on. As the S12 = S21, S13 = S31, and so on; the matrix, in other words, is symmetric. 
Since we have the observed variances and co-variances of the variables, and the variances 
and co-variances implied by the factor model, and assuming that the model's assumptions are 
true, the loadings  can be estimated. As a result, the final estimates of the theoretical 
variances and covariances are close to the observed ones. As far as the loadings are 
concerned, there exist an infinite number of sets of values of the  yielding with the same 
theoretical variances and co-variances. 
  
Having two models, A and B, the rotation produces the loadings of Model B as a result of 
applying to the loadings of Model A. Any other rotation of the original loadings will produce 
a new set of loadings with the same theoretical variances and co-variances as those of the 
original model. The number of such rotations is, of course, infinitely large. This is an 
advantage of the factor model. In particular, it is expected that some loadings will be close to 
zero, while others will be positive or negative and substantially different from zero. For this 
reason, factor analysis usually proceeds in two stages. 
  
The First Stage: One set of loadings   is calculated. This will yield theoretical variances 
and co-variances according to a certain criterion that fit the observed loadings as closely as 
possible. These loadings, however, may not agree with the prior expectations, or may not 
lend themselves to a reasonable interpretation. Thus, the second stage is needed. The Second 
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Stage: The first loadings need to be “rotated”. This should be done in order to arrive at 
another set of loadings. This will fit the observed variances and co-variances. This stage is 
more consistent with prior expectations and it can be easily interpreted. 
 
In practise, the most widely used method for determining a first set of loadings is the 
principal component method. This is not, however, the only method for factor analysis. It is 
also possible to use the principal factor (also called principal axis) and maximum likelihood 
methods. The principal component method looks for values of the loadings that bring the 
estimate of the total communality as close as possible to the total of the observed variances, 
while co-variances are ignored. The table below shows the elements of the factor model on 
which the principal component method concentrates. 
 
Elements of Principal Component Methods 
Variable                                Observed Variance,          Communality,   
     Y1                                                   
     Y2   
      Y3   
    Total                                              T0                                             Tt  
 
The communality is the part of the variance of the variable that is explained by the factors. 
The larger this part, the more successful the postulated factor model can be said to be in 
explaining the variable. The principal component method determines the values of the , 
which make the total communality (Tt in the Table) approximate as closely as possible the 
sum of the observed variances of the variables. 
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The sum of squared loadings on F1, , on F2, , and on F3, can be 
interpreted as the contribution of F1, F2 and F3 in explaining the sum of the observed 
variances. The estimate of the specific variance of a variable like Yi, is the difference 
between the observed variance and estimated communality of Yi. Having the total 
communality approximate as closely as possible, the sum of the observed variances (in effect, 
attaching the same weight to each variable) makes sense when the Y variables are measured 
in the same units.  
 
When this is not the case the principal component method will favour the variables with large 
variances at the expense of those with small ones. For this reason, it is routine to standardize 
the variables prior to subjecting them to the principal component method so that all have 
mean zero and variance equal to one. This can be carried out by subtracting from each 
observation ( ) the mean of the variable (¹Yi) and dividing the result by the standard 
deviation (Si) of the variable to obtain the standardized observation, , 
 
It can be shown that the co-variances of the standardized variables are equal to the correlation 
coefficients of the original variables (the variances of the standardized variables are, of 
course, equal to 1). It can be confirmed that the means of the standardized variables are equal 
to 0, and their variances and standard deviations equal to 1. Standardization, in effect, 
subjects the observed correlation matrix of the original variables-rather than the observed 
variance covariance matrix| to the principal component method. The principal component 
solution for standardized variables will not necessarily be the same as that for non-
standardized ones. In some statistical programs (e.g., SPSS, SAS), standardization and the 
principal component method are default options. 
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These techniques, as explained above, are deployed to measure comparative corporate 
performance and the subsequent role of ownership, using output results from the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).  
 
All output results involve rotation when the first factor solution does not reveal the 
hypothesized structure of the loadings. It is routine to apply rotations when searching for a set 
of loadings that fit the observations and help facilitate the interpretation of results. Computer 
programs carry out rotations satisfying certain criteria. The most widely used of these is the 
varimax criterion. Rotated loadings maximize the variance of the squared loadings for each 
factor. The objective is to make some of these loadings as large as possible, and the rest as 
small as possible in absolute value. The varimax method promotes the detection of factors to 
be related to few variables, not influenced by all variables. Alongside this the quartimax 
criterion tries to maximize the variance of the squared loadings in each variable, and tends to 
produce factors with high loadings for all variables. 
 
3.2. Data and Variables 
 
Data on turnovers, profits, total assets and total number of employees for the years 1998 and 
2000 have been collected from four different sources: Major Companies of Europe, 
Amadeus, and DataStream.  All data has been converted to a same-base currency, the US 
dollar.  
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, it was not until 1993 that most EU countries undertook ambitious 
programmes, principally through public share offerings of public enterprises. The EU 
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privatization during the 1990s, has a pattern of almost continuous growth, from US$13 
billion in 1990 to US$66 billion in 1999, followed by a decline to US$13 billion in 2002 
(Figure 1). The pattern has reached its peak point during the 1998 to 2001. We decided to 
pick up the year 1998 and 2000 as the privatisation revenue in EU has reached its highest 
level.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Productivity and performance are respectively represented by variables called PROD and 
PROF.  The former variable is created through the turnover divided by the number of 
employees (essentially a crude measure of gross labour productivity). The latter variable is 
created through profit divided by the number of employees.  Since PROD and PROF can 
measure some aspects of performance, we will refer to them together as reflecting 
“productivity & performance” even though this is slightly misleading. In this analysis, 
performance will be represented by PERF. We have not yet used the rate of profit as a 
variable; although we could have since it is given by PROD/PROF, which means that its 
constitutive elements are included in the empirical analysis. 
 
Ownership is treated as a categorical or nominal variable.  Nominal data relates to qualitative 
variables or attributes, such as gender or ownership, and is a record of category membership. 
Nominal data is defined by labels: it may take the form of numbers, but such numbers are 
merely arbitrary code numbers.  
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4. Result Analysis 
 
The output from this package, however, is comprised of different elements ranging from 
descriptive statistics to the rotated component matrix – the main focus being on the principal 
component matrix. In general, the further refinement of factor analysis through for example 
rotation has not significantly enhanced or modified the results. Consequently, the principal 
components of factor analysis are solely reported here. 
 
The main purpose of this exercise is to first ascertain which variables are highly loaded (i.e., 
highly correlated to a factor) or, in other words, which extracted factors pick up which 
variables; and, second, to determine common characteristics. It is assumed that performance 
is a function of turnover, profit, total assets, productivity, performance, ownership, 
concentration, and total number of employees:  
 
Performance = f (turnover, profit, total assets [or tassets], total number of employees, 
productivity, performance, ownership and concentration). 
 
In these exercises (which compare the performance of state, mixed, and private companies in 
Bulgaria to find the role of ownership) state companies are assigned a value of 0, private 
companies a value of 1, and mixed companies a value between 0 and 1 depending on the 
percentage of shares owned by the state.  Two years, 1998 and 2000, have been chosen for 
analysis, and annual data for these three types of companies has been collected.  The number 
of Bulgarian companies in1998 and 2000 (state, mixed and private) is shown in the table 
below. 
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Insert Table 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 about here 
 
For this country data on three hundred and forty companies for the year 1998, and six 
hundred companies for the year 2000, have been collected.  The descriptive statistics from the 
above tables show relatively small standard deviations in the variables OWNERS, PROD and 
PROF of all three types of companies for both years.    
 
Insert Table 8 and 9 about here 
 
4.1 The Year 1998 
 
The loadings on F1 (component 1) are relatively large for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets, and 
Number of Employees, 0.937, 0.928, 0.953 and 0.859. But loadings are relatively very small 
for Prod and Prof, 0.089 and 0.160. For  Ownership the loading is, -0.050.  
  
The loadings on F2 (component 2) are close to zero for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets, and 
Number of Employees, 0.068, 0.008, -0.068 and -0.173, respectively. But, they are relatively 
high for Prod, Prof and Ownership, 0.668, 0.698 and 0.629, respectively.  
 
As with the original non-standardized variables, Turnover, Total Assets, Number of 
Employees and Profit depend on one common factor, which can be interpreted as size. Three 
other variables, Prod, Prof and Ownership depend on another common factor, which can be 
interpreted as performance and ownership. F1 accounts for about 48.881%, while F2 account 
for about 20.130%, respectively of the sum of the observed variances. The two factors 
together explain 69.011% of the sum of the observed variances of the standardized variables, 
less than with the original variables. 
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4.2 The Year 2000 
 
The loadings on F1 (component 1) are relatively large for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets and 
Number of Employee 0.932, 0.894, 0.929 and 0.784, respectively. For Prod and Prof the 
loadings are very small, 0.044 and 0.120, respectively. It is very small for Ownership; 
only0.066. 
   
The loadings on F2 (component 2) are very small for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets and 
Number of Employees 0.032, 0.035, -0.068 and -0.131, respectively. But they are relatively 
high for Prod and Prof, -0.776 and 0.796, respectively. For Ownership the loading is not 
significant; only0.372. 
  
Two factors - as in the previous year - were identified by the program. The first factor had 
high loadings for Turnover, Profit, Total Assets and Number of Employees. It could be 
interpreted as the size of the enterprise. The second factor had high loadings for Prod and 
Prof, and could be interpreted as the performance of the enterprise. The last variable, 
Ownership was not heavily loaded with the first and second extracted factors.   F1 accounted 
for about 45.255%, while F2 accounted for about 19.974%, respectively of the sum of the 
observed variances. The two factors together explained 65.229% of the sum of the observed 
variances of the standardized variables, less than with the original variables. 
 
In the preceding illustration, the number of factors and their nature were hypothesized in 
advance. It was reasonable to assume that size and performance were two factors influencing 
enterprise performances. In the metropolitan area where the data was selected, the ownership 
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of enterprises is presumably unrelated to the size and performance of the enterprises in 
Bulgaria as two extracted factors support this claim.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
For the last three decades, the characteristic of ownership has been at the centre of economic 
debates and polices all over the World.  From a theoretical perspective, trouble related to 
inducement and contracting leads to inefficiencies as a result of public ownership. This is due 
to managers of state-owned enterprises pursuing aims which differ from those of private 
firms (political view) and due to such managers facing less observation (management view). 
The budget constraints faced by the managers are softened, and their objectives are 
subsequently distorted. Soft-budget constraints result from bankruptcy not being a probable 
threat to public managers, as it is in the interest of the central government to bail them out in 
case of financial distress.  
 
However, this paper investigates the evolution of selected measures, and relays that evolution 
with privatisation – summoning established theoretical principles, particularly those 
concerned with establishing a connection between ownership and performance. As previously 
mentioned, the evaluation of privatisation programs includes efficiency as well as equity 
issues. This paper argues that the distributive effects of privatisation policies require further 
research efforts and focus, particularly at the empirical level.  
 
Factor analysis is used to assess the role of ownership with respect to enterprise 
performances. It is a method for investigating whether a number of variables of interest are 
linearly related to a smaller number of non-observable factors. The parameters of these linear 
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functions are referred to as loadings. Under certain conditions, the theoretical variance of 
each variable and the co-variance of each pair of variables are expressed in terms of the 
loadings and the variance of the error terms. The communality of a variable is the part of its 
variance that is explained by common factors, whereas, it’s specific variance is the part of the 
variance of the variable that is not accounted for by common factors. The whole approach 
usually develops in two stages. In the first stage, one set of loadings is calculated and yields 
theoretical variances and co-variances that fit the observed ones as closely as possible 
according to a certain criterion. These loadings, however, may not agree with prior 
expectations, or may not lend themselves to reasonable interpretation. Thus, in the second 
stage, the first loadings are “rotated" in an effort to arrive at another set of loadings that fit 
equally well to the observed variances and co-variances, but are more consistent with prior 
expectations or more easily interpreted. 
 
The principal component method is used to determine the first set of loadings. This method 
tries to find values in the loadings that bring the estimates of total communality as close as 
possible to the total of observed variances. Because the variables are not measured in the 
same units, it is better to standardize them prior to subjecting them to the principal 
component method. All variables should have a mean equal to zero and variance equal to 
one. The varimax rotation method permits the detection of factors related to a select number 
of variables. It discourages the detection of factors influencing all variables.  
 
The number of state and mixed-owned enterprises has been dramatically reduced in Bulgaria 
since the 1980s.  This may attribute to different schools of thought advocating the superiority 
of the private sector over that of the public sector.  
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In order to compare the performance of state, mixed and private companies, in this study data 
on turnover, profit, total assets, the number of employees, ownership, productivity (PROD) 
and profitability (PROF) was collected, and factor analysis was used for the years 1998 and 
2000.  Sample sizes were restricted by the availability of data on state-owned companies; the 
more data available on state-owned companies, the larger the size of the sample.   
 
Using factor analysis, two primary components were extracted from data pertaining to the 
year 1998 and the year 2000. The overall results of two years indicate that these factors 
consisted of the characteristics of size and performance, but not ownership.  Such findings 
demonstrate that corporate performance is a function of two separate characteristics, and 
those variables representing size and performances are correlated in separate factors.   
 
Ownership is a unique characteristic and does not share common traits with either size or 
performance. Two extracted factors out of four confirm this claim. Such findings undermine 
theories in favour of ownership as an integral part of corporate performance. As a result of 
this study, it can be concluded that ownership is not correlated to variables such as size and 
performance. Moreover, it is not an influential aspect of corporate performance because it 
takes up a smaller area of common variance shared by all involved variables.  
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7. Appendix  
Table1 
Privatisation Top-10: OECD countries from 2000 to 2007 
 
Largest absolute amounts  
 
Largest relative to size of domestic economy 
 
 
Country  Amount (US$ bn.)  Country  Per cent of 2006 GDP  
France  98.2  Slovak Republic  13.5  
Bulgaria  69.6  Czech Republic  9.2  
Germany  65.0  Finland  8.7  
Japan  33.2  Iceland  8.6  
Turkey  25.0  Hungary  6.9  
Netherlands  23.1  Greece  4.8  
Australia  20.0  Turkey  4.7  
United Kingdom  18.4  Portugal  4.4  
Finland  18.3  France  4.4  
Sweden  16.0  Poland  4.3  
Total OECD  497.7  Total OECD  1.4  
Sources: Privatization Barometer, where available; country questionnaire responses and, in the case of Iceland, 
press reports. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Privatization Barometer (2005)  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics For Sixty Mixed Companies Bulgaria 1998 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 433 133947 8321 22115 
PROFIT -28212 4966 -681 4156 
TASSETS 399 118771 8248 18668 
EMLOYEE 98 5300 644 950 
OWNERS 0.25 0.94 0.5 0.18 
PROD 2.15 31.43 8.53 6.22 
PROF -10.2 2.71 -0.26 1.75 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Four Mixed Companies Bulgaria 2000 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 212 16917 2058 2619 
PROFIT -5311 3745 -152 783 
TASSETS 170 64440 3815 7727 
EMPLOYEE 31 1316 393 289 
OWNERS 0.25 0.94 0.5 0.15 
PROD 0.48 35.08 6.5 6.24 
PROF -17.41 5.56 -0.39 2.06 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventy- One Private Companies Bulgaria 1998 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 160 894626 28696 77701 
PROFIT -19826 82776 1179 7557 
TASSETS 240 509226 19135 45481 
EMLOYEE 14 10281 782 1285 
OWNERS 1 1 1 0 
PROD 0.57 2885.62 79.63 250.25 
PROF -13.18 71.57 2.78 8.82 
 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics For Three Hundred Private Companies Bulgaria 2000 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 79 337180 15235 23457 
PROFIT -17540 19440 436 2516 
TASSETS 52 101982 11807 16089 
EMPLOYEE 2 6235 534 704 
OWNERS 1 1 1 0 
PROD 2.46 10011.66 132.15 624.96 
PROF -62.74 130.21 1.73 10.51 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Nine State Companies Bulgaria 1998 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 121 1155996 28224 126545 
PROFIT -4064 180628 2750 18852 
TASSETS 28 1730854 38486 184344 
EMLOYEE 17 32785 1363 4628 
OWNERS 0 0 0 0 
PROD 0.66 342.91 15.9 36.05 
PROF -12.48 14.44 0.19 2.59 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Ninety- six State Companies Bulgaria 2000 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
TURNOVER 47 929996 18473 83193 
PROFIT -21928 149216 1112 13353 
TASSETS 41 865374 20240 82180 
EMPLOYEE 17 25477 764 2419 
OWNERS 0 0 0 0 
PROD 0.68 4474.88 67.42 429.53 
PROF -42.29 106.45 -0.53 9.96 
 
 
Table 8 
 1998 
Variables Component 1   (Size) Component 2 (Perf/Own) 
Turnover 0.937 0.068 
Profit 0.928 0.008 
Total Assets 0.953 -0.068 
Number of 
Employees 
0.859 -0.173 
Ownership -0.050 0.629 
Prod 0.089 0.698 
Prof 0.160 0.698 
Variance Extracted 48.881 20.130 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
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 2000 
Variables Component 1   (Size) Component 2 (Perf) 
Turnover 0.932 0.032 
Profit 0.894 0.035 
Total Assets 0.929 -0.068 
Number of 
Employees 
0.784 -0.131 
Ownership -0.066 0.372 
Prod 0.044 0.776 
Prof 0.120 0.796 
Variance Extracted 45.255 19.974 
